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 In light of concerns that politics, philosophy, and ideology now domi-
nate the federal judicial appointment process—a process that many claim 
should emphasize ethics, competence, and integrity—scholars have offered 
a range of proposals. A considerable number, though, aim to compel 
elected actors to focus on the candidates’ qualifications rather than on 
their political preferences. 
 Without taking a normative position on these sorts of proposals, we 
demonstrate empirically that the process leading to the appointment of (at 
least) Supreme Court Justices may not be the “mess” that the proposals 
suggest. While it is true that U.S. Senators are more likely to cast votes for 
nominees who are ideologically proximate to them, qualifications also play 
a significant role in accounting for the choices Senators make. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 In recent testimony before the U.S. Senate, the legal scholar 
Ronald D. Rotunda declared that:  
Our judicial system is at the top of the food chain, and that is a 
good reason to leave well enough alone. Given the fact that the 
Senate has been confirming federal judges for years, and the prod-
uct is admired around the world, one wonders why we should 
think of changing the way the Senate confirms.1  
 Without doubt, the vast majority of Rotunda’s colleagues—not to 
mention many members of the Senate—would disagree. For at least 
two decades now, they have deemed the federal confirmation process 
a “mess,”2 “abysmal,”3 “broken,” “going in the wrong direction,”4 and 
downright “disorderly, contentious, and unpredictable.”5 Of course, 
pinpointing the precise cause of the “problem” has generated its own 
share of controversies.6 But there does seem to be general agreement 
that politics, philosophy, and ideology now dominate a process that 
should emphasize ethics, integrity, and competence—and as a result, 
the quality of our nation’s judiciary, along with its independence, has 
suffered if not markedly declined.7  
                                                                                                                     
 1. Ronald D. Rotunda, quoted in Senate Committee Hearings on the Judicial Nomi-
nation Process: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Administrative Oversight and the Courts on the Senate’s Role in the Nomination and Con-
firmation Process: Whose Burden?, September 4, 2001, published in 50 DRAKE L. REV. 511, 
524 (2002). 
 2. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL 
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (1994). 
 3. Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299, 301 
(2004). 
 4. John Cornyn, Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process and the Need for Filibus-
ter Reform, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 181, 184 (2003) (quoting Senator Dianne Fein-
stein). 
 5. MARK SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIOUS CHOICES: THE NEW POLITICS OF SUPREME COURT 
NOMINATIONS 6 (1994). 
 6. E.g., HERMAN SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS 166 (1988) (claiming that the 
“crusade” of conservative interests to “pack the courts with ideological zealots has induced 
more rather than less partisanship” in the selection process); SILVERSTEIN, supra note 5, at 
6 (asserting that the current state of the confirmation process reflects “profound changes in 
American politics and institutions,” not the least of which is the “heightened activism of 
the modern federal judiciary”); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Confirming Supreme Court Justices: 
Thoughts on the Second Opinion Rendered by the Senate, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 101, 117 (ar-
guing that the problem is with the President’s failure to “seek[] more ‘advice’ from the Sen-
ate prior to a nomination,” which would keep the media and interest group campaigns 
“within more tolerable bounds”); Jeffrey K. Tulis, Constitutional Abdication: The Senate, 
the President, and Appointments to the Supreme Court, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1331, 1331 
(1997) (suggesting that the problem lies with “[t]he altered relation of President and Con-
gress in the appointment of justices of the Supreme Court”).  
 7. See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 2; Choi & Gulati, supra note 3. On the other hand, 
we hasten to note, there are at least a handful of scholars who disagree with the view that 
politics is necessarily a danger to be avoided at all costs. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Ideology and the Selection of Federal Judges, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 619, 620 (2003) (assert-
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 In light of these concerns, policymakers, social scientists, and le-
gal academics have offered a range of proposals aimed at refocusing 
the spotlight on a candidate’s qualifications for office, rather than his 
or her ideology.8 Some have suggested, for example, that while the 
President should be free to consider any criteria he deems relevant, 
the Senate ought to eschew detailed examinations of the nominees’ 
politics and philosophy.9 As Professor Douglas W. Kmiec recently told 
the Senate: 
My proposition is simple: the proper Senate inquiry of a judicial 
candidate is demeanor, integrity, legal competence, and fidelity to 
the rule of law. It is not partisanship or policy agreement. While 
textually the Senate is free to inquire and to reject a nominee on 
any ground—even a highly political, constitutionally problematic 
one like the nominee’s views on outcomes in specific cases—it 
should not do so. Undertaking to make nominees carry a type of 
political burden of proof will over time merely invite a subservi-
ence of mind and personality that is contrary to an independent 
judiciary.10 
Others cast only a partial concurrence, asserting that both the 
Senate and President should focus exclusively or almost exclusively 
on a nominee’s “objective” or “technical” qualifications.11 Some even 
                                                                                                                     
ing that both Presidents and Senates have and will continue to make their nomina-
tion/confirmation decisions, at least in part, on the basis of ideology and that “[t]his is ex-
actly how it should be”); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber, Democracy and Disagreement: 
A Comment on Jeremy Waldron’s Law and Disagreement, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 
35 (2002).  
 8. For lists of these proposals, see CARTER, supra note 2, at 187-206, and GEORGE 
WATSON & JOHN A. STOOKEY, SHAPING AMERICA: THE POLITICS OF SUPREME COURT 
NOMINATIONS 214-19 (1995). See also infra note 11. 
 9. See, e.g., 133 CONG. REC. S11,269 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1987) (statement of Sen. 
McConnell exhorting his colleagues to consider only the fitness of the nominee); 133 CONG. 
REC. S10,538 (daily ed. July 23, 1987) (statement of Sen. Dole urging the Senate to focus 
on the nominee’s “ability and integrity”); John S. Baker, Jr., Ideology and the Confirmation 
of Federal Judges, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 177 (2001); Richard D. Freidman, Tribal Myths: Ide-
ology and the Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominations, 95 YALE L.J. 1283 (1986); Ste-
phen L. Martino, Note, Change on the Horizon: A Prospective Review of the Nomination 
and Confirmation Process of the United States Supreme Court, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 164, 174 
(2001) (asserting that many Presidents have “argued that appointments to the court are 
largely the prerogative of the chief executive . . . . [They] have believed that minimal com-
petency standards should serve as the Senate’s measuring stick and confirmations should 
be free of partisanship and ideology.”); Randall R. Rader, The Independence of the Judici-
ary: A Critical Aspect of the Confirmation Process, 77 KY. L.J. 767 (1988-89); see also John 
D. Felice & Herbert F. Weisberg, The Changing Importance of Ideology, Party, and Region 
in Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees, 1953-1988, 77 KY. L.J. 509 (1988-89). 
 10. Douglas W. Kmiec, quoted in Senate Committee Hearings on the Judicial Nomina-
tion Process: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Ad-
ministrative Oversight and the Courts on the Senate’s Role in the Nomination and Confir-
mation Process: Whose Burden?, September 4, 2001, published in 50 DRAKE L. REV. 511, 
553 (2002). 
 11. See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 2, at 178; HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, 
PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM 
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go so far as to propose a “tournament” among judges of the U.S. 
courts of appeals to ensure the selection of “effective” Justices,12 while 
simultaneously reducing the “level of partisan bickering.”13  
 Without taking a normative position on these sorts of proposals—
or registering our complete agreement with Rotunda’s claim that 
“[o]ur judicial system is at the top of the food chain, and that is a 
good reason to leave well enough alone”14—we demonstrate empiri-
cally that the process leading to the appointment of (at least) Su-
preme Court Justices may not be the “mess” they suggest. In general, 
we find that while it is in fact the case that U.S. Senators are more 
likely to cast votes for nominees who are ideologically proximate to 
them, it is also true that the nominees’ qualifications play a signifi-
cant role in accounting for the choices Senators make.15 More specifi-
cally, we show that qualifications have a significant impact on Sena-
tors who are ideologically distant from a nominee. That is, while 
Senators may very well support a politically akin candidate regard-
less of his or her professional merit—they also will cast a yea vote for 
a high-quality nominee regardless of his or her ideology. 
 We develop these findings in four steps. In Part II, we briefly con-
sider allegations about the growing role of politics and the concomi-
                                                                                                                     
WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 328 (new & rev. ed. 1999). Senator Paul Simon, on the other 
hand, supplies a list of criteria that he thinks ought to guide the President’s selection. See 
PAUL SIMON, ADVICE & CONSENT 310-17 (1992). More generally, there are endless varia-
tions on proposals designed to reform the appointment process. One particularly prominent 
set advocates an active role for the Senate in checking the President’s nominations (espe-
cially if they appear ideologically driven) or, at the very least, recommends that the Presi-
dent seek more advice from the Senate before he announces a nomination. See, e.g., 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT (1985); Ginsburg, supra note 6; 
Donald E. Lively, The Supreme Court Appointment Process: In Search of Constitutional 
Roles and Responsibilities, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 551 (1986); Henry Paul Monaghan, The Con-
firmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1202 (1988); William G. Ross, The 
Functions, Roles, and Duties of the Senate in the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 28 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 633 (1987); Nina Totenberg, The Confirmation Process and the Public: 
To Know or Not to Know, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1213 (1988). 
 12. Choi & Gulati, supra note 3, at 299. 
 13. Id. at 301-02. 
 14. In fact, reasons exist to believe that our system is not “at the top of the food chain.” 
See, e.g., Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity 94 (2004) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the authors) (asserting that the Canadian Supreme Court “is rapidly be-
coming one of the most influential courts worldwide on human rights issues” because of its 
“active” participation in global judicial networks). Along similar lines, see Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Courting the World: U.S. Judges Must Overcome a Culture of Legal Isolationism—
or Risk Being Left Behind, FOREIGN POL’Y, Mar. 1, 2004, at 78 (claiming that “[b]y exchang-
ing views, sharing expertise, and citing each other’s opinions, judges around the world are 
cobbling together a global legal structure—one the United States ignores at its peril”). 
 15. We are not the first to make this claim. See Charles M. Cameron et al., Senate 
Voting on Supreme Court Nominees: A Neoinstitutional Model, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 525 
(1990); Jeffrey A. Segal et al., A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting: Senators, Constituents, 
Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Confirmations, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 96 
(1992). The conclusions we reach in this Essay flow from our efforts to adapt, refine, and 
extend the 1990 article. 
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tant declining role of qualifications in the appointment of Justices. 
Part III describes the statistical model we deploy to assess the role of 
ideology versus qualifications in the Senate’s decision over Supreme 
Court nominees. Because the measures we invoke to animate the 
concepts of “ideology” and “qualifications” are crucial to the credibil-
ity of our modeling exercise, we describe them in some detail. Next, 
in Part IV, we turn to the results yielded by our statistical analysis; 
in particular, we examine the substantive effects of ideology and of 
qualifications on the votes of individual Senators. Since that analy-
sis, as we foreshadow above, underscores the importance of qualifica-
tions for a seat on the Supreme Court, our findings deserve some at-
tention in light of existing proposals to change how the United States 
appoints its judges. We take up this matter in Part V.  
II.   THE CONFIRMATION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: POLITICS 
VERSUS QUALIFICATIONS 
 Academics and policymakers alike have expressed a number of con-
cerns over the process by which Supreme Court Justices attain their 
seats on the bench.16 But one concern rising above nearly all others cen-
ters on the increasingly politicized nature of the process. In some of this 
commentary, the focus is on the role of organized interests and the me-
dia. Silverstein summarizes their influence by stating that “[t]he harsh 
reality . . . that modern interest group and media politics shape the se-
lection of judges to our highest courts . . . has provoked a good deal of 
concern on the part of politician and citizen alike, and calls for the re-
form of the process of ‘advice and consent’ are frequently heard.”17 In 
other investigations elected actors move to center stage. Schwartz, for 
example, has argued that “[a]lthough partisan politics are inevitable to 
some extent, such considerations . . . [until the 1980s] played a very mi-
nor role in lower court appointments and only a slightly greater role in 
Supreme Court nominations.”18 Carter, too, agrees that the process is 
now overtly and overly politicized, but he emphasizes ideology rather 
than “party labels”: “Litmus tests,” he writes, “became far more impor-
tant [during the Reagan and Bush I administrations]—and far more 
consistent—than at any time in the past.”19 
 Has the process, in fact, grown more political in any or all of these 
ways? If we focus exclusively on the amount of media and interest group 
attention to nominations, the answer is undoubtedly yes. Consider, for 
example, Figure 1, infra, which shows the number of groups supplying 
                                                                                                                     
 16. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 11; CARTER, supra note 2; Choi & Gulati, supra 
note 3; Ginsburg, supra note 6. 
 17. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 5, at 164. 
 18. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 6.  
 19. CARTER, supra note 2, at 71.  
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oral or written testimony for or against each nominee since Earl War-
ren.20 Even though the most recent nominees (Justices Ginsburg and 
Breyer) failed to generate substantial interest group opposition (or sup-
port) relative to other recent nominees, the data overall evince a clear 
upward trend: A simple bivariate regression shows that with each pass-
ing nomination since Warren’s, 1.23 more groups participated.21 
FIGURE 1 
NUMBER OF INTEREST GROUPS PRESENTING 
ORAL OR WRITTEN TESTIMONY FOR OR AGAINST 
EACH NOMINEE FROM EARL WARREN TO RUTH 
BADER GINSBURG.22 
 
                                                                                                                     
 20. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 361 (3d ed. 2003). 
 21. Although we should not put much weight on a bivariate regression, the results are 
as follows (** indicates p ≤ .001): 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT (STANDARD ERROR) 
Counter 1.232** (0.282) 






 22. Id. Warren was nominated in 1953 and confirmed in 1954; Kennedy was nomi-
nated in 1987 and confirmed in 1988. Note that we do not include Homer Thornberry or 
Douglas Ginsburg because those nominations were withdrawn before any Senate action. 
The Fortas nomination (for Chief Justice in 1968) was also withdrawn, but only after a 
Senate vote to end a filibuster failed to receive the necessary two-thirds majority.  
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However intriguing the data may be, it represents but the tip 
of the iceberg. The data captures only activity that occurs in public 
view—and on the floor of the Senate—when we know interest 
groups regularly lobby behind the scenes, whether in the corridors 
of Congress or on the pages of The New York Times.23 But even 
with this limitation it would be hard to argue that the data dis-
played in Figure 1 fails to support Caldeira and Wright’s astute 
observation:  
[T]he selection of [Supreme Court Justices]—once a “cozy trian-
gle” of senators, the executive branch, and the bar—has became a 
major arena for the participation of interest groups . . . . What is 
more, despite changes in administration, the broad participation 
of organized interests and the battle lines drawn in the 1980s 
over the politics of judicial nominations [persist].2423 
Conveying a similar message about the increasingly politicized en-
vironment surrounding the appointment process are the data in 
Figure 2, infra. There we illustrate the increase in media coverage 
of individual nominations over time, with the dots indicating the 
precise magnitude of the growth (for example, Justice Ginsburg’s 
appointment in 1994 generated 49 more stories [in The New York 
Times and Time magazine] than did her predecessor, Byron White’s 
about three decades earlier, in 1962). Note that in every instance 
the successor nominees received more coverage than their predeces-
sors and that overall, The New York Times and Time magazine pub-
lished 358 more stories about the post-1980 nominees, for a mean 







                                                                                                                     
 23. Indeed, one study estimates that at least 150 organizations participated in one 
way or another in the Bork nomination, David Austen-Smith & John R. Wright, Counter-
active Lobbying, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 25, 35 (1994), while just thirty-eight provided testi-
mony.   
 24. Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Lobbying for Justice: The Rise of Organ-
ized Conflict in the Politics of Federal Judgeships, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 44-45 (Lee 
Epstein ed., 1995). Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out that while interest group partici-
pation in nominations is on the upswing, it is “not an entirely new phenomenon,” as Yalof 
points out. “Organized interests,” he continues, “figured significantly in defeating Stanley 
Matthews’s nomination to the Court in 1881. Almost fifty years later, an unlikely coalition 
of labor interests and civil rights groups joined together to defeat the nomination of John 
Parker.” DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES 16 (1999) (footnote omitted); see also 
Caldeira & Wright, supra, at 47-50. 
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FIGURE 2 
CHANGE (INCREASE) IN THE NUMBER OF STO-
RIES PUBLISHED IN THE NEW YORK TIMES AND 
TIME MAGAZINE FROM NOMINEES APPOINTED 
SINCE 1980 AND THEIR PREDECESSORS.2524 
 
 These data lend some support to those who argue that the envi-
ronment surrounding Senate contemplation of Supreme Court nomi-
nees has grown increasingly political and highly charged. But the 
more relevant question is the extent to which U.S. Senators are po-
litical in response. Do Senators’ votes, in other words, attend to ideo-
logical and partisan-political concerns rather than to a candidate’s 
qualifications to serve on the high Court? 
 The answer, according to much of the existing commentary,26 is 
yes. As Watson and Stookey write, a common complaint about the 
process is that “voting of the Senate has reflected political motives 
and ignored whether in fact the nominee is qualified.”27 Carter, the 
author of The Confirmation Mess, surely concurs,28 as does Silver-
stein: 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine prominent members of 
one political party today championing the nomination of a member 
                                                                                                                     
 25. The source of this data is RICHARD DAVIS, ELECTING JUSTICE: FIXING THE 
SUPREME COURT NOMINATION PROCESS (2005). 
 26. Exceptions here include Cameron et al., supra note 15; Segal et al., supra note 15. 
In Part IV we refine and update the Cameron analysis. 
 27. WATSON & STOOKEY, supra note 8, at 214.  
 28. See CARTER, supra note 2. 
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of the opposition to the Supreme Court, and the notion that a 
president might be constrained to seek only nominees of stature 
and prominence is simply too fanciful to be seriously entertained. 
That a Democratic nominee with the long public career and the 
controversial publications of a [Benjamin] Cardozo could be nomi-
nated by a Republican president and confirmed by a voice vote of a 
Republican-controlled Senate, all within a period of ten days, is it-
self beyond modern comprehension.29 
This is but a sampling of the conventional wisdom regarding the 
triumph of politics over credentials in the confirmation process; 
other exemplars would hardly be difficult to unearth.30 Nor, we 
hasten to note, would it be difficult to locate social science evi-
dence supporting these beliefs. From their analyses of seven 
nominations—Fortas (1968), Haynsworth, Carswell, Rehnquist 
(1971), Rehnquist (1986), Bork, and Thomas—Watson and Stookey 
claim that they can accurately predict 81.43% (n = 643) of the ap-
proximately 700 votes cast based solely on the ideology and politi-
cal party affiliation of the Senators.31 Massaro, in a study of the 
failed Fortas, Haynsworth, and Carswell nominations, goes even 
further—parsing the effect of the Senators’ ideology and partisan-
ship on their roll call votes. At the end of the exercise, Massaro 
concludes that “[i]n all three nominations, ideology is indicated to 
be a more convincing factor than party affiliation in explaining 
Senate voting on the Fortas cloture roll call and on the 
Haynsworth and Carswell nominations.”32 
III.   QUALIFICATIONS AND THE CONFIRMATION OF SUPREME COURT 
NOMINEES: OUR STUDY 
 While these and other analyses seem to clinch the case—the con-
firmation of Supreme Court Justices is now much more about politics 
and ideology than it is about integrity and ethics—they are not with-
out their flaws. Most relevant is that the authors select only those 
nominations that are controversial, thereby begging the question of 
what factors, including (the lack of) qualifications, lead to contro-
versy. It also is the case that the authors base their conclusions on 
                                                                                                                     
 29. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 5, at 2. 
 30. See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 2. 
 31. See WATSON & STOOKEY, supra note 8, at 185, 190. 
 32. See JOHN MASSARO, SUPREMELY POLITICAL: THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY AND 
PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT IN UNSUCCESSFUL SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS 15 
(1990); see also DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION 
MAKING 106 (1976). Rohde and Spaeth conducted a similar investigation of the nomina-
tions of Fortas (for Chief Justice in 1968), Haynsworth, Carswell, and Rehnquist (for as-
sociate in 1971) and reached the same general conclusion: “[I]t is the degree of liberalism 
of a senator and not his party affiliation which is related to his voting on nominations.” 
Id. 
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statistical models that take into account only politics and ideology; 
they fail to attend to qualifications, along with other factors that may 
affect the confirmation decision.33 As such, they cannot possibly as-
sess the extent to which ideology, qualifications, both, or neither af-
fect the votes cast by Senators. Making that assessment requires a 
consideration of all the relevant factors simultaneously in one statis-
tical model.34 
 To our knowledge, only one team of researchers has undertaken 
this task—Cameron, Cover, and Segal in their 1990 article appear-
ing in The American Political Science Review35—and it is that 
team’s lead that we follow here. Momentarily, we unveil our plan 
for so doing, that is, for refining and extending this classic study. 
Here and now, though, we simply want to outline the underlying 
logic of our (and the Cameron et al.) analysis. For starters, it is im-
portant to understand what we are seeking to explain, namely, the 
votes cast by individual Senators over Supreme Court nominees 
since Warren in 1953.36 These votes, in other words and in the par-
lance of social science, constitute the dependent variable in our 
study.  
 Second, we attempt to explain these votes via three sets of fac-
tors, or independent variables: qualifications,37 ideology,38 and con-
trol variables.39 The first two—qualifications and ideology—
constitute the primary variables of interest; that is, we gear our 
study toward understanding whether nominees’ qualifications, 
their ideological proximity to Senators, neither, or both account for 
Senators’ votes. Control variables are those that we also think 
may affect confirmation votes, and therefore we must consider 
them to avoid “omitted variable bias.”40 Here those variables are, 
as they were in the Cameron et al. analysis, whether the President 
is “strong” and whether the Senator is of the same party as the 
President.41 
                                                                                                                     
 33. For other problems with these sorts of studies, see Cameron et al., supra note 15, 
at 526.  
  34. For more on this point, see Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1, 76-80 (2002). See also infra note 40 and accompanying text. 
  35. Cameron et al., supra note 15; see also Segal et al., supra note 15. However, here 
we focus on extending and refining the earlier 1990 piece.  
  36. Warren was nominated in 1953 and confirmed in 1954. More generally, see infra 
Part III.A for more information on Senate votes over nominations to the Court. 
 37. See infra Part III.B. 
 38. See infra Part III.C. 
 39. See infra Part III.D. 
 40. Epstein & King, supra note 34; GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: 
SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1994). Omitted variable bias occurs 
when a statistical comparison excludes variables that are (a) known to affect the outcome 
and (b) correlated with the explanatory covariate of interest. 
  41. Cameron et al., supra note 15. 
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 Finally, we require a statistical method that enables us to esti-
mate the effect of these independent variables on the dependent 
variables (the votes of individual Senators). For the reasons we ex-
plain in Part IV, a maximum-likelihood probit model is ideally suited 
for our purposes. 
 With our general plan outlined, let us now turn to the task of 
fleshing it out by providing details on the dependent variable, the 
independent variables, and our statistical model. We then, in 
Part IV, turn to an inspection of the results yielded by our analy-
sis. 
A.   The Dependent Variable: Confirmation Votes 
 The dependent variable of our study consists of the 2461 confir-
mation votes cast by individual Senators on the Supreme Court 
nominees from Earl Warren, in 1953, through Stephen G. Breyer, in 
1994.42 Of the 2461 total votes, 15.35% (n = 378) were cast against 
the nominee and 84.65% (n = 2084) were cast in the nominee’s fa-
vor.  
 Since our website houses the vote data, along with all other vari-
ables included in this study,43 we merely summarize, in Table 1, in-
fra, the aggregate votes for and against each nominee. Note that 
most votes have not been close. Thus the mode of nay votes is zero. 
On the other hand, a great deal of variation exists from nominee to 
nominee, such that the number of nay votes on average is 14.81, 







                                                                                                                     
 42. Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, United States Congres-
sional Roll Call Voting Records (Study No. 4), at http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-
STUDY/00004.xml (last modified June 17, 2004). 
  43. Lee Epstein et al., The Role of Qualifications in the Confirmation of Nominees to 
the U.S. Supreme Court, at http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/qualified.html (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2004) (providing data for this Essay). 
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TABLE 1 
SENATE VOTES ON SUPREME COURT NOMI-
NEES, 1953-1994.44 
NOMINEE VOTES IN FAVOR VOTES OPPOSED 
Earl Warren (CJ) 
John Marshall Harlan 
William J. Brennan, Jr. 
Charles Evans Whittaker 
Potter Stewart 
Byron Raymond White 
Arthur Joseph Goldberg 
Abe Fortas 
Thurgood Marshall 
Abe Fortas (CJ) 
Warren Earl Burger (CJ) 
Clement Haynsworth, Jr. 
G. Harrold Carswell 
Harry A. Blackmun 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
William H. Rehnquist 
John Paul Stevens 
Sandra Day O’Connor 
William H. Rehnquist (CJ) 
Antonin Scalia 
Robert H. Bork 
Anthony M. Kennedy 
David H. Souter 
Clarence Thomas 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg 





















































                                                                                                                     
  44. The letters “CJ” indicate the President nominated the candidate for Chief Jus-
tice. The vote on Fortas for the Chief Justice position was on cloture and failed to receive 
the necessary two-thirds majority. Voice votes were taken on the nominations of Warren, 
Brennan, Whittaker, White, Goldberg, and Fortas (for an Associate Justice position). Id. 
The voice votes are treated as unanimous because there is no data on the counts. It is 
worth noting that we reran the model presented in Table 2, infra, at p. 1168, without the 
six “voice vote” nominees and all the variables continued to generate statistically signifi-
cant (p < .05) coefficients (the p-value for Lack of Qualifications drops from .005 to .032, 
and the p-value for Ideological Distance drops from .010 to .012). Also worth noting is 
that Felice and Weisberg report that across four of the voice votes (Warren, Brennan, 
Fortas, and Goldberg) there was, in fact, opposition from a total of (at least) seven Sena-
tors. Felice & Weisberg, supra note 9, at 515. Six of these seven Senators’ votes were 
modified from yeas to nays (the seventh did not participate in the vote over the nominee 
he apparently opposed), and we reran the model depicted in Table 2. Once again, all the 
variables continue to generate statistically significant (p < .05) coefficients (the p-value 
for Lack of Qualifications moves from .005 to .002, and the p-value for Ideological Dis-
tance moves from .01 to ≤ .001). 
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B.   An Independent Variable of Primary Interest: Qualifications 
 What the vote data reveals, to put it simply, is that while Senators 
overwhelmingly vote in favor of confirmation (84.65% of all votes are 
yeas), we could hardly deem decisions over Supreme Court nominees 
consensual. In eighteen of the twenty-six cases, the nominee caused 
some degree of division among the Senators. This is important for our 
purposes, since without variation in votes, even limited variation, we 
would have little to explain; we might well conclude that the Senate 
merely supported (or opposed) the President’s choice.45 
 Since this is clearly not the case, let us now turn to the factors 
that may explain the variation we observe, beginning with qualifica-
tions. As we have noted throughout, many would agree with Choi and 
Gulati when they write: 
[D]iscussion[s] [over Supreme Court nominees are now] almost en-
tirely political (focusing on litmus tests such as a candidate’s likely 
position on abortion). Occasionally, a nominee’s intellectual ability 
is mentioned, but this topic has time and time again been placed to 
the side in favor of a discussion of the nominee’s political beliefs.46 
Choi and Gulati may be right in their characterization of the current 
state of appointment discourse, but does that necessarily mean that 
qualifications play an insignificant role (relative to other factors) in a 
Senator’s decision to vote for or against a candidate, especially when 
the Senator is ideologically distant from the candidate? 
 To address this question, we must develop a measure of “qualifica-
tions.” Given the disagreement among scholars and policymakers over 
the characteristics that make for a “qualified” nominee, this is no simple 
mission. Indeed, there are some who seem to argue that we ought to jet-
tison it altogether. To them, attempts to devise “objective” indicators of 
qualifications or merit are “doomed to failure” because “‘[q]ualifications’ 
always have been and always will be defined politically.”47 
 We cannot say we disagree, but devising a measure of merit based 
on Senators’ (or even scholars’) colored definitions of merit is not our 
project. Rather, our goal is to tap into the Senators’ or—more precisely, 
assuming that Senators are oriented toward reelection—their con-
stituents’ perceptions of whether a candidate is qualified or not. This 
requires us to locate a measure of qualifications from sources external 
to and independent of the Senate (and, of course, that is available and 
observable prior to its vote). 
                                                                                                                     
  45. But we could not, nor should we, eliminate the possibility that the President 
nominated individuals he believed the Senate would confirm. See Byron J. Moraski & 
Charles R. Shipan, The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations: A Theory of Institutional 
Constraints and Choices, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1069 (1999).  
 46. Choi & Gulati, supra note 3, at 300-01 (footnote omitted). 
 47. WATSON & STOOKEY, supra note 8, at 219. 
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 One measure that comes readily to mind is the Nominee ratings 
produced by the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Standing Com-
mittee on the Federal Judiciary. The ABA’s ratings are presumably 
extrinsic to individual Senators, are announced prior to the confirma-
tion vote, and, according to the ABA, are “impartial evaluations of 
the integrity, professional competence and judicial temperament” 
that “[do] not consider a nominee’s philosophy or ideology.”48 How-
ever, they are also problematic in any number of ways. One is that 
the Committee’s rating system has fluctuated with time, and even 
within particular periods it has lacked consistency. For example, un-
til 1970 it typically rated a candidate as simply “qualified” or “un-
qualified.” In 1963, however, it deemed Arthur Goldberg “highly ac-
ceptable,” but the ABA thought it inappropriate to proffer “an opinion 
to the degree of qualification.”49 Also problematic for our purposes are 
allegations that ABA ratings evince a (liberal) ideological bias;50 that 
bias may explain George W. Bush’s decision to end the Committee’s 
“semi-official” role in conducting pre-nomination evaluations of judi-
cial candidates, a role it has played since the Eisenhower administra-
tion.51 
 Given these concerns, we think it is best to eschew the ABA ap-
proach in favor of the one that Cameron and his colleagues developed 
and used in their study of Senate votes: a measure of qualifications 
derived from a content analysis of newspaper editorials written from 
the time of nomination by the President until the vote by the Sen-
ate.52 Specifically, Cameron and his colleagues selected four of the 
nation’s leading newspapers, two with a liberal outlook (The New 
York Times and The Washington Post) and two on the more conserva-
tive end (the Chicago Tribune and the Los Angeles Times) and identi-
                                                                                                                     
 48. American Bar Association, ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary, at 
http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/home.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).  
  49. ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 25. For the language the ABA has used in its ratings, 
see EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 20, at 359-60.  
 50. See, e.g., James Lindgren, Examining the American Bar Association’s Ratings of 
Nominees to the U.S. Courts of Appeals for Political Bias, 1989-2000, 17 J.L. & POL. 1 
(2001). 
  51. See Neil A. Lewis, Bar Association’s Role in Screening Federal Judges Is Re-
viewed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2001, at A16. The Bush administration has denied this 
charge, claiming instead, in a letter to the President of the ABA:  
The issue at hand . . . [is] whether the A.B.A. alone—out of the literally dozens 
of groups and many individuals who have a strong interest in the composition 
of the federal courts—should receive advance notice of the identities of poten-
tial nominees in order to render prenomination opinions on their fitness for ju-
dicial service. 
Neil A. Lewis, White House Ends Bar Association’s Role in Screening Federal Judges, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 23, 2001, at A13. Ultimately, the administration decided the ABA should not 
receive advance notice. Id. 
 52. See Cameron et al., supra note 15, at 529-30. The same research team also used 
the qualifications measure in Segal et al., supra note 15, and the scores are reported in 
EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 20, at 361. 
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fied every editorial that offered an opinion on the candidate’s qualifi-
cations (from the nominations of Earl Warren through Anthony Ken-
nedy). With the editorials in hand, Cameron and his colleagues coded 
their content on the basis of claims about the nominee’s acceptability 
from a professional standpoint;53 the research team then created a 
scale of qualifications for each nominee that ranges from one (most 
qualified) to zero (least qualified).54 
 Following procedures set forth by Cameron and his colleagues, 
Segal updated their measure to include the four nominations subse-
quent to Anthony Kennedy, and we now display the results, the 
qualification scores for all nominees from Earl Warren to date, in 
Figure 3, infra. From the data it is easy to see why we and others 
find this measure so compelling: it seems to have a high degree of fa-
cial validity; that is, it appears to comport with our existing knowl-
edge of the nominees. Note, for example, that it is Carswell, reckoned 
“mediocre” even by supporters,55 who receives the lowest score, while 
it is Kennedy, Ginsburg, Scalia, and several others—that is, candi-
dates even would-be opponents admitted were qualified to serve56— 
who received the highest score. 
                                                                                                                     
  53. To provide an example (one of which comes from our updating of the Cameron et 
al. qualifications score), consider the following statement, which appeared in an editorial 
about Ruth Bader Ginsburg in The New York Times:  
The bridge she builds to justices like John Harlan, who served from 1957 to 
1971, is a reminder of the mediocrity of so many appointees of the Bush-Reagan 
years. Nominees chosen for ideology, or with sparse credentials out of political 
necessity, by increments have depressed the Court’s performance, professional 
standing and fidelity to law. President Clinton’s nominee brings a touch of class 
to the Supreme Court. 
A Touch of Class for the Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1993, at E16. We coded this as a posi-
tive statement about Ginsburg’s professional qualifications.  
 The following, also appearing in The New York Times, would be a negative statement 
about Clarence Thomas’s professional qualifications:  
 Believe him or not, nothing in this bizarre episode enhances Judge Thomas’s 
qualifications, which were slim to start. Believe him or not, his behavior on the 
witness stand does nothing to enhance those qualifications. Believe him or not, 
to confirm him is to gamble. 
 If Judge Thomas were a brilliant jurist, a Holmes or a Brandeis, the gamble 
might be justified. But Clarence Thomas offers no such brilliance, no basis for 
gambling with the public’s confidence in, and the future of, American law. 
Against Clarence Thomas: Even ‘Don’t Know’ Calls for a ‘No’ Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 
1991, at A24. 
 54. In our analysis, we use a nominee’s lack of qualifications, rather than his qualifi-
cations, as an independent variable. We derive the Lack-of-Qualification variable simply 
by subtracting the Qualification measure from one.  
 55. Recall Senator Roman Hruska’s (infamous) defense of Judge Carswell: “Even if he 
were mediocre, there are a lot of mediocre judges and people and lawyers. They are enti-
tled to a little representation, aren’t they, and a little chance?” LAWRENCE BAUM, THE 
SUPREME COURT 47 (1st ed. 1981).  
 56. Note that these three run the ideological gamut from conservative to relatively 
moderate to liberal, and yet all received the ABA’s highest endorsement: well qualified by 
a unanimous vote. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 20, at 360. 
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FIGURE 3 
PERCEIVED QUALIFICATIONS OF SUPREME 
COURT NOMINEES, 1953-1994.57 THE SCORES 
RANGE FROM ONE (MOST QUALIFIED) TO ZERO 
(LEAST QUALIFIED). 
 
 Facial validity, though, is not the only reason why we invoke these 
measures in our quest to explain Senate votes for Supreme Court nomi-
nees. At least three others come to mind. First, the scores meet our 
original criteria of being external to the Senate (it is newspaper editors 
and not Senators from whom we derived the scores) and of being avail-
able and observable prior to the Senate’s vote. Second, the scores pass 
standard criteria for intercoder reliability: using π as their index, Cam-
eron and his colleagues report results of .87 (p < .001).58 Finally—and 
perhaps not so stunningly, given the range of newspapers consulted—
the measure does not appear biased by ideology or political party; in 
other words, neither liberals nor democrats receive higher (or lower) rat-
ings based solely on their policy preferences or partisanship.59 
 Despite these advantages, at least one scholar has critiqued the ap-
                                                                                                                     
 57. The letters “CJ” indicate the President nominated the candicate for Chief Justice. 
We do not include Homer Thornberry or Douglas Ginsburg because those nominations 
were withdrawn before any Senate action. The Fortas nomination (for Chief Justice in 
1968) was also withdrawn, but only after a Senate vote to end a filibuster failed to receive 
the necessary two-thirds majority. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 20, at 361. 
 58. Cameron et al., supra note 15, at 533. 
 59. A bivariate regression of the qualification score on our measure of ideology (see 
Part III.C) produces an insignificant coefficient (p = .136), as does a regression of qualifica-
tions on the nominee’s political party (p = .642).  
2005]                         THE ROLE OF QUALIFICATIONS 1161 
 
proach on the ground that it does not fit with his “conviction that the 
measure of characteristics such as ‘qualifications’ or even ‘ideology’ is 
never static but fluctuates over time in response to the political realities 
of the day.”60 But because the measure is indeed dynamic in this way—
after all, its developers derived it from editorials contemporaneous with 
the nomination—this is actually yet another benefit of, rather than a fa-
tal flaw in, our approach to assessing a candidate’s qualifications.  
C.   Ideology 
 “Qualifications” is one of our variables of chief concern; the other is 
ideology (or policy preferences). Specifically, in line with existing com-
mentary, we expect that Senators are more likely to vote for nominees 
who are ideologically proximate to them (or their constituents)61 than 
they are for nominees who are ideologically distant, especially if the 
nominee is not particularly well qualified.  
 To assess this hypothesis we require not one but two measures of ideol-
ogy—the candidate’s and the Senator’s—as well as a method for comparing 
the two so that we can calculate the distance between them. In what fol-
lows, we elaborate on these requirements and how we fulfilled them. 
1.   The Ideology of the Nominee 
 To assess the ideology of nominees, we must develop a measure that 
is independent of judicial behavior (or at least independent of behavior 
on the Supreme Court), that we can calculate for all nominees (thereby 
eliminating, for example, votes cast or opinions written as a lower court 
judge), and that we can observe prior to the Senate’s vote.  
 Since these are some of the very same criteria that guided our selection 
of a measure of qualifications, it will come as no surprise that our measure 
of ideology is quite similar to an ideological score developed by political sci-
entists Segal and Cover from newspaper editorials written between the 
time of nomination to the Supreme Court and the Senate’s vote.62 
 The procedures used by Segal and Cover to analyze the editorials are 
virtually the same as those Cameron, Cover, and Segal invoked to create 
their measure of qualifications, but here, of course, they focused their 
                                                                                                                     
 60. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 5, at 5.  
 61. We do not attempt to separate a Senator’s personal ideology from that of his or her 
constituents; rather, we rely on analyses of roll call votes in the form of NOMINATE scores. 
For an effort to separate Senate and constituent preferences, see Segal et al., supra note 15.  
 62. Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme 
Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989). Segal and Cover made use of the same four 
newspapers as did Cameron et al. in developing the qualifications measure: The New York 
Times, The Washington Post, the Chicago Tribune, and the Los Angeles Times. Cameron et 
al., supra note 15; see Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme 
Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812 (1995) (updating the Segal and Cover scores to cover 
the four most recent nominees: Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer).   
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content analysis on ideology. As Segal and Cover tell it:  
[W]e trained three students to code each paragraph [in the editorial] for 
political ideology. Paragraphs were coded as liberal, moderate, conser-
vative, or not applicable. Liberal statements include (but are not limited 
to) those ascribing support for the rights of defendants in criminal 
cases, women and racial minorities in equality cases, and the individual 
against the government in privacy and First Amendment cases. Con-
servative statements are those with an opposite direction. Moderate 
statements include those that explicitly ascribe moderation to the 
nominees or those that ascribe both liberal and conservative values.63 
Segal and Cover then measured judicial ideology by subtracting the 
fraction of paragraphs coded conservative from the fraction of para-
graphs coded liberal and dividing by the total number of paragraphs 
coded liberal, conservative, and moderate. The resulting scale of ideol-
ogy (or policy preferences) ranges from zero (unanimously conservative) 
to .50 (moderate) to one (unanimously liberal). Figure 4 displays the 
score for each post-1953 nominee.  
FIGURE 4 
PERCEIVED IDEOLOGY OF SUPREME COURT NOMI-
NEES, 1953-1994.64 THE SCORES RANGE FROM ZERO 
(MOST CONSERVATIVE) TO ONE (MOST LIBERAL). 
 
                                                                                                                     
 63. Segal & Cover, supra note 62, at 559. 
 64. The letters “CJ” indicate the President nominated the candidate for Chief Justice. 
See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 20, at 361. 
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 These ideological scores have developed quite a following in the 
social sciences, and it is not hard to see why. Just as the qualification 
score appears facially valid, so too do the ideological scores. To be 
sure, there are some exceptions (for example, Clarence Thomas 
seems more conservative than his score), but overall the measure 
comports with our impressions of those nominees who ascended to 
the Court. William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, generally re-
garded as liberals, received scores of 1.00; Scalia and Rehnquist, gen-
erally regarded as conservatives, received scores of .00 and .05 re-
spectively.65  
 For our purposes the scores’ degree of validity (and reliability)66 is 
important, but they are also of Court behavior, available for all our 
nominees, and observable prior to the Senate’s vote. In other words, 
the scores fulfill just about all the needs of our research.  
2.   The Ideology of Senators 
 Assessing the ideology of Senators is not a particularly chal-
lenging task. For over a decade now, social scientists have invoked 
NOMINATE scores or a variation of them (such as the ones we use 
here, Common Space Scores)67 to measure the ideology of Sena-
tors.68 These scores result from subjecting congressional roll call 
votes to a scaling algorithm designed to identify each Congres-
sional member’s position in an ideological space.69 The first dimen-
sion coordinate (which we use here) typically picks up the lib-
eral/conservative dimension of conflict in American politics and 
                                                                                                                     
 65. In fact, scholars have found that the ideological scores provide a satisfactory 
predictor of judicial votes. See, e.g., Segal & Cover, supra note 62; Segal et al., supra 
note 62. Certainly they explain the votes in some issues better than they do in others. 
See Lee Epstein & Carol Mershon, Measuring Political Preferences, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
261 (1996). But overall, across a range of cases, they have above-threshold predictive 
power. For example, for the nominees in our study who attained seats on the Court, the 
correlation between the ideological scores and votes in civil liberties cases is .771 and for 
economic cases it is .620. 
 66. Using π, Cameron and his colleagues report reliability results of .72 (p < .001). 
Cameron et al., supra note 15, at 533. 
  67. Some scholars use the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) vote scorecards to 
measure the ideology of Senators. But, because the ADA relies only on a subset (and a non-
random one at that) of votes to compute its scores, we eschew this approach in favor of 
NOMINATE scores, and specifically the Common Space Scores. We have several reasons 
for taking this particular tack, most importantly because it provides us with scores for 
Presidents, and we ultimately deploy those scores to derive Common Space Scores for 
nominees. See infra Part III.C.3.  
 68. See Keith Poole, DW-NOMINATE Scores, at http://www.voteview.com/dwnomin.htm 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2005); Keith Poole, Description of NOMINATE Data, at 
http://www.voteview.com/page2a.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2005) (describing differences among 
the kinds of NOMINATE coordinates); see also KEITH T. POOLE AND HOWARD ROSENTHAL, 
CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING (1997). 
  69. All votes with less than 97.5% agreement are scaled, and all members who voted 
at least twenty-five times in a given Congress are scaled.  
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ranges from negative one (most liberal) to one (most conserva-
tive).70 
 Of course, our interest is in the ideology of the individual Sena-
tors who voted on Supreme Court nominees. But, for purposes of 
illustration, we provide, in Figure 5, infra, a glimpse of the ideol-
ogy of the Senate during the nominations under study here. Spe-
cifically, we depict the NOMINATE Common Space Score of the 
median member of the Senate at the time of the confirmation pro-








                                                                                                                     
  70. We should note that by invoking these scores, we depart from Cameron and 
his colleagues who used the ADA vote scorecards. See supra note 67. In computing the 
ideological distance between the Senators and nominees, Cameron and his colleagues 
compared, on the same metric, the Segal and Cover scores (their and our measure of 
nominee ideology) and the ADA scores (their measure of Senate ideology). See Cam-
eron et al., supra note 15, at 533. We, of course, use a different measure of Senate ide-
ology (the Common Space Scores), and we take a different tack in computing the dis-
tance between Senators and nominees. See infra Part III.C.3. Nonetheless, we did rep-
licate their model (using their measures but including the four most recent nominees) 
to assess the compatibility of our approach and theirs. No major distinctions arose, as 
even a quick glance at the table below and the one presented in Table 2, infra, at 
p. 1168, would reveal. 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT (STANDARD ERROR) 
Lack of Qualifications  
Ideological Distance  
Lack of Qualifications × Ideological Distance  
Strong President  





















Probit estimates of Senators’ votes on Supreme Court nominees, using the Cameron et al. 
approach (** indicates p ≤ .01). 
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FIGURE 5 
THE IDEOLOGY OF THE MEDIAN MEMBER OF 
THE SENATE DURING SUPREME COURT CON-
FIRMATION PROCEEDINGS, FROM EARL WAR-
REN TO STEPHEN BREYER.71 THESE ARE (FIRST 
DIMENSION) COMMON SPACE SCORES, WHICH 
RANGE FROM NEGATIVE ONE (MOST LIBERAL) 
TO ONE (MOST CONSERVATIVE). 
 
 Interesting, of course, is the disparate ideological conditions pre-
vailing at the various nominations. Note, for example, the relatively 
“friendly” environment surrounding the confirmation of Thurgood 
Marshall: a liberal nominee (Marshall attains a perfect one (liberal) 
score on Segal and Cover’s ideological scale) facing one of the most 
liberal Senates in our database (a median Common Space Score of 
-.1575). In direct contrast comes the conservative Robert Bork (a .10 
on the Segal and Cover scale), who was forced to confront a relatively 
liberal Senate (a median Common Space Score of -.0665).72 
3.   Comparing the Ideology of Nominees and Senators 
 Whether the hospitable political environment explains Marshall’s 
success and the relatively hostile environment explains Bork’s failure 
                                                                                                                     
  71. See Keith Poole, Common Space Data, at http://www.voteview.com/readmeb.htm 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2005). 
  72. The median Senate first dimension Common Space Score over all the nominations 
is -.057, and the mean is -.033 with a standard deviation of .314. Id. 
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remains an open question—and one that the forthcoming analyses 
are precisely designed to explain. But, before we turn to those analy-
ses, we have several more steps to take, including among the most 
delicate: devising a method to compare the ideologies of Senators and 
nominees so that we can compute the distance between them. Only 
by deriving such a “distance” variable can we determine the extent to 
which politics enters into the decisions of individual Senators. 
 This is indeed a delicate task in light of the measures we employ 
to tap the preferences of these actors: the Segal and Cover scores for 
nominees and the Common Space Scores for Senators. Because these 
preference proxies are not directly comparable, merely subtracting 
one from the other will produce a problematic measure of the dis-
tance between them.  
 We solve this problem by making use of the underlying logic of the 
Cameron et al. analysis—which conceptualizes distance by squaring 
the difference between the ideology of the nominee and the ideology 
of the Senator—but we adapt it to our measurement strategy.73 Spe-
cifically, we arrive at a Common Space Score for each nominee so 
that we can directly calculate the distance between his or her ideol-
ogy and that of the voting Senators. (We derived the score by apply-
ing a linear transformation, which we generated by regressing presi-
dential Common Space Scores on the Segal-Cover scores.74)  
D.   Control Variables 
 As we have stated throughout, “Ideology” and “Qualifications” 
constitute our chief independent variables, but there are two others 
that Cameron and his colleagues (and, indeed, any analysis of Senate 
voting over Court nominees ought) take into account: the “Strength of 
the President” and “Same Party.”75 The strength of the President cap-
                                                                                                                     
  73. Recall that Cameron and colleagues compared (on the same metric) the Segal and 
Cover scores (their and our measure of Court ideology) and the ADA scores (their measure of 
Senate ideology). Cameron et al., supra note 15, at 533; see also supra notes 67, 70. We would 
be in error to do the same given our assessment of Senate ideology via Common Space Scores. 
 74. The specific steps we took are as follows:  
 We began by estimating a simple OLS regression model with presidential ideology 
NOMINATE Common Space Scores as the dependent variable and the Segal and Cover 
scores as the only independent variable. We included only those Presidents whose party con-
trolled the Senate at the time of confirmation, under the assumption that such Presidents are 
(relatively) unconstrained and thus able to appoint nominees who mirror their own ideology. 
 The OLS regression provided the following linear transformation to calculate Common 
Space Scores for nominees from Segal and Cover scores: Common Space Score = 0.4401225 
- 0.9148797 (Segal and Cover). 
 We then applied that transformation to all nominees to derive the Common Space 
Scores. The (euclidean) distance variable was calculated according to the following for-
mula: Euclidean Distance = (cs1 - cs_nom) (where cs1 is the first dimension Common Space 
Score for Senators, and cs_nom is the Common Space Score for Nominees). 
 75. Cameron et al., supra note 15, at 530-31. 
2005]                         THE ROLE OF QUALIFICATIONS 1167 
 
tures the idea that some Presidents are simply in a better position to 
attain approval of their nominees than are others. We attend to this 
idea as did Cameron and his colleagues,76 with a variable that takes 
on the value of one if the President’s political party controls the Sen-
ate and the President is not in the fourth year of his term of service. 
Otherwise, the value is zero. The second control variable, which we 
include for all the obvious reasons, indicates whether the President 
and the individual Senator are of the same political party. If they are, 
the variable is coded one. If they are not, the variable is coded zero. 
E.   Summary of the Model 
 To summarize, we argue that four factors explain the votes of in-
dividual Senators on nominees to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
1. Lack of Qualifications: The lower a nominee’s qualifications (see 
Figure 3),77 the lower the probability of a Senator voting in favor 
of the nominee. 
2. Ideological Distance: The further the ideological distance between 
a nominee (see Figure 4)78 and a Senator, the lower the probabil-
ity of a Senator voting in favor of the nominee. 
3. Strong President: If a President is strong, the higher the prob-
ability of a Senator voting in favor of the nominee.  
4. Same Party: If a President and Senator are of the same political 
party, the higher the probability of a Senator voting in favor of the 
nominee. 
Given the way we code the variables, we expect the estimated coeffi-
cients on the first two variables to be negatively signed, and on the 
second two variables, positive.  
 Finally, we incorporate into our model a crucial fifth variable—one 
representing the interaction between Qualifications and Ideological 
Distance. This enables us to determine the extent to which Senators 
vote against unqualified nominees, who are ideologically distant from 
them (as we might hypothesize), apart from any independent effects 
the two variables may exert on that vote. For example, just as Repub-
licans found President Clinton’s ethical failings to be far more serious 
than did Democrats, we might expect liberals to be far more affected 
by the charges against Clarence Thomas, and conservatives far more 
troubled by the ethical allegations against Abe Fortas. Whether this 
“conditional” response to a nominee’s professional integrity (or, more 
pointedly, lack thereof) is the result of motivated reasoning, the psy-
                                                                                                                     
 76. Id. at 529-30.  
 77. See supra p. 1160 fig.3. 
 78. See supra p. 1162 fig.4. 
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chological reflex that causes humans to believe those arguments they 
wish to believe, or sheer hypocrisy is beyond the scope of this study; 
we simply hypothesize that the data will indicate behavior consistent 
with the response.  
IV.   RESULTS OF THE ANALYSES 
 Because the outcome of our dependent variable, a Senator’s vote, 
is binary (yea or nay), standard OLS regression is inappropriate. Ac-
cordingly, we explore the effect of the variables on the vote choice via 
a probit model, which we estimate using maximum likelihood.  
 Table 2 summarizes the results, which, all in all, appear satisfac-
tory. Each coefficient runs in the right direction; each is statistically 
significant at p ≤ .01; and none is trivial in size. We thus could say 
much the same of our exercise as did the Cameron team about theirs: 
“Judged by an array of statistical criteria, the model was very suc-
cessful.”79 
TABLE 2 
PROBIT ESTIMATES OF SENATORS’ VOTES ON 
SUPREME COURT NOMINEES.80  
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT (STANDARD ERROR)
Lack of Qualifications  
Ideological Distance  
Lack of Qualifications × Ideological Distance  
Strong President  





















 These basic results now noted, let us consider how they inform 
the major concern of this Essay: the relative roles of politics and 
professional merit in the confirmation of Supreme Court Jus-
tices.81 Beginning with politics, Table 2 tells us that the coefficient 
produced by the Ideological Distance variable is negative and sig-
nificant, indicating that, in fact, politics does play a role in confir-
mation proceedings: As the ideological distance between a Senator 
and nominee increases, the probability of a nay vote increases. So 
                                                                                                                     
  79. Segal et al., supra note 15, at 109.  
 80. ** indicates p ≤ .01. 
  81. Note that Table 2 displays probit coefficients, which are not as easy to interpret 
as, say, OLS regression coefficients. Accordingly, in our discussion of the results here and 
elsewhere, we transform them into probabilities.  
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too, as we can see in the left panel of Figure 6, infra, this statisti-
cal finding is not, especially if we keep in mind that nearly eighty-
five percent of all votes are “yeas,” without substantive import. 
Figure 6, infra, demonstrates that the probability, across the 
twenty-six nominees under investigation, of a favorable vote varies 
depending on a Senator’s proximity to the candidate under consid-
eration. When we set all other variables at their mean (or median 
[in the case of variables that take on values of 0 or 1], except for 
the interaction term), the likelihood, on average, of a Senator vot-
ing for a candidate is .235 when that Senator and the candidate 
are ideological extremes (the black line). That figure increases by 
a factor of 4.23, to .994, when they are at the closest levels (the 
dashed line). 
FIGURE 6 
THE EFFECT OF IDEOLOGY AND QUALIFICATIONS 
ON THE VOTES OF SENATORS OVER SUPREME 
COURT NOMINEES FROM EARL WARREN TO 
STEPHEN BREYER.82 EACH CURVE REPRESENTS 
THE PROBABILITY DENSITY OF VOTING YEA ON THE 
NOMINEE, ACCOUNTING FOR THE UNCERTAINTY IN 
OUR ESTIMATES. ALL VARIABLES ARE SET AT THEIR 
SAMPLE MEANS (OR MEDIANS) (FOR EACH PANEL, 
THE VARIABLE ON THE X-AXIS IS INTERACTED WITH 
THE SAMPLE MEAN OF THE OTHER VARIABLE). THE 
LEFT PANEL SHOWS THESE PROBABILITIES FOR 
IDEOLOGICALLY DISTANT NOMINEES (BLACK) AND 
IDEOLOGICALLY PROXIMATE NOMINEES (DASHED); 
THE RIGHT PANEL, FOR HIGHLY UNQUALIFIED 
NOMINEES (BLACK) AND HIGHLY QUALIFIED 
NOMINEES (DASHED). 
 
                                                                                                                     
  82. We generated these figures using the program Zelig, Version 1.1-2 2004. See Ko-
suke Imai et al., Zelig: Everyone’s Statistical Software, at http://gking.harvard.edu/zelig 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2005); see also Gary King et al., Making the Most of Statistical Analy-
ses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 347 (2000).  
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 Nearly as important as the candidate’s policy preferences (relative 
to the Senator’s), though, is his or her professional merit. To see this, 
consider the right panel which demonstrates the probability of a 
Senator voting for a nominee on the basis of the nominee’s qualifica-
tions. Notice that when a nominee is perceived as highly unqualified 
(the black line) and all other variables are at their mean (or median, 
except for the interaction term), the likelihood of a Senator casting a 
nay vote is (1 - .75 = .25); that probability decreases 125-fold to (1 - 
.998 = .002) when the nominee is highly qualified (the dashed line).  
 Figure 6 depicts the likelihood of a yea vote when all the variables 
(except those of interest) are set at their mean (or median, except for 
the interaction term). Also worthy of exploration are other possible 
scenarios, such as the one we display in Figure 7, infra: when the 
President is at his lowest level of influence because the Senator and 
the President hail from different parties, the President’s party does 
not control the Senate, or he is in the fourth year of his term of ser-
vice (and all other variables are set at their mean or median, except 
for the interaction term). Note, first, the effect of ideological distance 
(depicted in the left panel): if the ideological distance is minimal (the 
solid line), the Senator will still, in all likelihood, vote for the Presi-
dent’s nominee (.914 probability) even though the President is quite 
weak. But the odds turn against the President (.025) when the Sena-
tor and the nominee are ideological extremes (the dashed line). Now 
consider the near-parallel effect of qualifications (shown in the right 
panel): Presidents—even those with severely limited political clout—
will have a far easier time attaining the confirmation of their candi-
date if Senators perceive that candidate as highly qualified (.915 for 
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FIGURE 7 
THE EFFECT OF IDEOLOGY AND QUALIFICATIONS ON 
THE VOTES OF SENATORS OVER SUPREME COURT 
NOMINEES, FROM EARL WARREN TO STEPHEN 
BREYER, WHEN THE PRESIDENT IS AT HIS LOWEST 
LEVEL OF INFLUENCE.83 EACH CURVE REPRESENTS 
THE PROBABILITY DENSITY OF VOTING YEA ON THE 
NOMINEE, ACCOUNTING FOR THE UNCERTAINTY IN 
OUR ESTIMATES. THE LEFT PANEL SHOWS THE 
PROBABILITY OF A SENATOR CASTING A YEA VOTE 
WHEN THE SENATOR AND THE NOMINEE ARE 
IDEOLOGICALLY PROXIMATE (THE BLACK LINE) AND 
IDEOLOGICALLY DISTANT (THE DASHED LINE). 
 
 Taken collectively, these results indicate that both ideology and qualifica-
tions have a significant, independent effect on the Senate’s decision to con-
firm. However, it is the interaction between the two that provides the great-
est explanatory power. Senators will most certainly vote for candidates who 
are ideologically close and well qualified, and they also will almost certainly 
vote against candidates who are distant and not qualified. And, yet, while the 
odds are high that they will vote for an undeserving candidate who is ideo-
logically proximate (for example, Southern Democrats and Clement 
Haynsworth)—thereby underscoring the role of politics—it is also the case 
that they will, under certain conditions, support a distant candidate if they 
perceive that candidate to be highly meritorious (for example, Republicans 
and Ruth Bader Ginsburg), thereby underscoring the role of qualifications. 
 Figure 8, infra, explores this relationship between ideology and qualifi-
cations. The left panel compares qualified candidates (the top vertical lines, 
representing a ninety-five percent confidence interval) and unqualified 
                                                                                                                     
 83. The right panel shows the probability of a Senator casting a yea vote when a nominee is 
perceived as highly qualified (the black line) and highly unqualified (the dashed line). In both pan-
els we set the President at his weakest: he and the Senator are from different parties and his party 
does not control the Senate or he is in the last year of his term. All other variables are set at their 
sample means (or medians) (for each panel, the variable on the x-axis is interacted with the sample 
mean of the other variable). We generated these figures using Zelig. See King et al., supra note 82. 
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candidates (the lower vertical lines, also a ninety-five percent confidence in-
terval) over the range of the Ideological-Distance variable when the Presi-
dent is weak and all other variables are at their mean (except for the inter-
action term).84 The right panel is a comparison between ideologically close 
candidates (the top vertical lines) and those that are distant (the lower ver-
tical lines), over the range of the Lack-of-Qualifications variable.85 The re-
sults are intriguing and underscore the claim that a significant difference 
exists, as indicated by the nonoverlapping vertical lines, between qualified 
candidates and those less qualified in terms of their likelihood of attaining 
a position on the Court, even at the lowest levels of ideological distance. 
Candidates who are highly meritorious and ideologically proximate are vir-
tually assured a position on the Court, but the probability of confirmation 
uniformly decreases as the Lack-of-Qualifications variable moves from the 
lowest (most qualified) to highest (least qualified) levels. 
FIGURE 8 
THE RELATIVE EFFECTS OF IDEOLOGY AND 
QUALIFICATIONS ON THE VOTES OF SENATORS OVER 
SUPREME COURT NOMINEES, FROM EARL WARREN 
TO STEPHEN BREYER.86 THE LEFT PANEL 
(IDEOLOGICAL DISTANCE) SHOWS THE PROBABILITY 
OF A SENATOR CASTING A YEA VOTE WHEN THE 
NOMINEE IS HIGHLY QUALIFIED (DARKER VERTICAL 
LINES) AND NOT QUALIFIED (LIGHTER VERTICAL 
LINES) OVER THE RANGE OF THE IDEOLOGICAL 
DISTANCE VARIABLE. THE RIGHT PANEL (LACK OF 
QUALIFICATIONS) SHOWS THE PROBABILITY OF A 
SENATOR CASTING A YEA VOTE WHEN THE SENATOR 
AND THE NOMINEE ARE IDEOLOGICALLY PROXIMATE 
(DARKER VERTICAL LINES) AND IDEOLOGICALLY 
DISTANT (LIGHTER VERTICAL LINES) OVER THE 
RANGE OF THE LACK OF QUALIFICATIONS VARIABLE. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 84. The pooled first difference mean (standard deviation) = -0.8073 (0.158). 
 85. The pooled first difference mean (standard deviation) = -0.7477 (0.1741). 
  86.  In both instances the President is “weak” and all other variables are set at their 
mean (or median, except for the interaction term). We generated these figures using the 
program Zelig. See supra note 82.  
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V.   DISCUSSION 
 Virtually all contemporary writing on the confirmation of Su-
preme Court nominees has it exactly right: politics plays a critical 
role. Our statistical modeling exercise leaves little doubt that Sena-
tors are more likely to vote for nominees who share their policy pref-
erences; they also are more likely to support the candidates of Presi-
dents who share their partisanship.87 
 But that same modeling exercise also leaves little doubt about the 
crucial role of qualifications. Whether Senators perceive a candidate 
as meritorious affects their votes and, indeed, exerts an effect nearly 
as strong as ideological proximity. Hence, our results give some em-
pirical teeth to Watson and Stookey’s assertion that the current “jus-
tices are [not] less well qualified on some objective measure . . . than 
justices of the past.”88 
 Of course, this is not to say that the President always taps the 
“most capable,” the “best qualified,” or the “most meritorious” person 
at any given time to fill any given vacancy. It is possible that there 
was someone in 1969 more qualified than Warren Burger to serve as 
Chief Justice or more meritorious than was Stephen Breyer in 
1994—to name just two of the twenty-six nominees we examined. It 
is necessary, however, that any proposals to reform the process ac-
count for the chief lesson of this study: qualifications do not appear to 
play a trivial role in the confirmation of Justices. This result, at the 
very least, should be a cause for pause before we offer (and policy-
makers consider) schemes for abrupt change, such as a tournament 
among judges, which may not only perpetuate perilous norms,89 but 
also, by virtue of eliminating all but federal judges, eliminate the 
“most capable,” the “best qualified,” and the “most meritorious” per-
son from consideration for a seat on the nation’s highest court.90 
                                                                                                                     
  87. See supra p. 1168 tbl.2.  
 88. WATSON & STOOKEY, supra note 8, at 222. 
  89. See Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and Its Conse-
quences for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CAL. L. REV. 903 (2003).  
  90. This is not the place to conduct a detailed investigation of whether nominees with 
or without prior federal judicial experience make better Supreme Court Justices. (For this 
type of analysis, see Workshop on Empirical Research in the Law, On Tournaments for 
Appointing Great Justices to the U.S. Supreme Court, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 157 (2004).) How-
ever, it is worth noting that in a 1998 survey (the most recent we could locate) asking 
scholars to rate the fifty-two Justices appointed in the twentieth century (from Holmes 
through Breyer), only one appellate court judge (Harlan II) received an “excellent” rating, 
even though there were plenty of potential candidates. Instead, the balance of the list con-
sisted of the familiar “greats”: Holmes and Brandeis (tied for the first and second spots), 
Cardozo, Brennan, Warren, Hughes and Black, Stone, Frankfurter, and R. Jackson. Mi-
chael Comiskey, Has the Modern Senate Confirmation Process Affected the Quality of U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices? (1998) (unpublished manuscript), cited in ABRAHAM, supra note 
11, at 372. Interestingly enough, as Professor Abraham notes, Comiskey answers his re-
search question in the negative.  
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